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What is the Problem with Foreign Advisers?
by Timothy and Leslie Nutty 1
Most advisors and aid administrators see themselves as
technocrats, in many cases sincerely dedicated to the cause of
economic development, whose job it is to help determine and imple-
ment that allocation of the available resources which will most
effectively promote economic and social development. As such they
produce a great many worthy papers arguing cogently against stepping
into this or that economic pitfall. In Pakistan, for example,
various aid and advisory agencies have frequently campaigned for
such unexceptionable and even progressive causes as lower guaran-
teed prices for foodgrainn in the face of recent surpluses, more
rigorous and objective appraisal of development projects, more
rational management of foreign exchange, land reform, educational
reform, etc. etc. It is therefore understandable when they react
indignantly to suggestions that they have contributed to the
difficulties, inefficiencies and anomalies which, in many cases,
they have actively worked against.
Good intentions and worthy papers, even when presented to
cabinet ministers do not measure the real impact which foreign
agencies, advisers and aid have made. What we must try to assess
is the extent to which foreign involvement may have served to
support and maintain an economic structure antipathetic to devel-
opment (defined to mean increaaing welfare or consumption for the
total population) which, once established, generates its own
self-perpetuating indigenous lines of development. We would like
-to outline a few examples from the case of Pakistan which illu-
strate these anos,1ies in the advisory relationship.
To begin with, one aspect of the aid effort which contributes
to the difficulty of properly measuring its true impact is the
ambiguity in the role of the aid/advisory agencies, which almost
inevitably acquire a vested interest in self-perpetuation. No-
one really wants to work himself out of a job, and organisations
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are no different, Advisory groups, like other non-profit
making, non-self-supporting organisations, must demonstrate
"success" in order to continue to receive the funds which are
essential to their continued existence. Likewise promotion and
mobility of individual advisers also depends on their own "Success"
and the reputation of the organisation they work for. The criteria
which tend to be applied, whether by the World Bank, the UN, the
Ford Foundation or the trustees of a large university, usually
involve affirmation from the host government that the advisory
group or adviser in question is desired and important. The more
vigorously the host government expresses this, the more likely the
agency is to be considered 'successful' and to get the necessary
finance.
But host governments will not go out of their way to support
an advisory agency unless they consider that it will actually
render services which they consider worth having. It goes
without saying that what a host government considers "services
worth having" may have little to do with liberal western notions
about development. Quite apart from the obvious unsavoury
possibilities, it is frequently the case that the most useful
service an advisory agency can render is to be a salea-mazi-cum-
public relations-advertising agency for the host regime.
To a host government the poliical value in the international
arena of having highly qualified, supposedly objective outsiders
providing a sophisticated, intellectually respectable and "inde-
pendent" defense of its policies and achievements, is enormous.
In the competition for development aid it can be worth many
millions of dollars. Under these circumstances it is in the best
interest of the agency to present only the rosy side of an
economy's development efforts. Since it is also in the agencys
interest to prove "success" by demonstrating that their advice is
seen to be taken and also seen to work, there is a second built-in
influence im the relations between advisers and host governments
which assures that the advisers will concentrate their efforts
on those policy problems least in conflict with vested interests
in the host country and which are most likely to evoke a positive
response from the host government, Advisory groups working
independent of aid-giving governments often refer to this as
"pragmatism". But inevitably this relationship leads to emphasis
on policies quickly and easily reflected in GNP and similar data,
and relative neglect of policies with perhaps longer gestation
periods or with less easily measurable impact (such as education).
Another aspect of foreign advisory services which make them
attractive to host governments is that they provide essential
expertise without being able (even if they so wished) to exercise
any of the political leverage which normally goes with being
indispensible. In many under-developed countries today the
government is at odds with its own intellectuals, In many of
these countries those citizens who possess the skills needed by
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the government tend to be precisely the young, energetic, highly
educated, and often radical (by the standards of the incumbent
regime) intellectuals who are in conflict with existing authority.
Por governments to turn to their own "Young Turks" for essential
expertise has serious political implications. Advisory agencies
provide a safe way of sidestepping this problem0
In addition, should it transpire that policies or events
go awry, the advisers can serve as convenient (if temporary)
scapegoats for the regime, thus diverting attention from failure
and helping to protect the government from the political conse-
quences0
When foreign advisers fail to examine the source of authority
of the regime whom they serve, they nay also fail to recognise
that their specific proposals on any given policy issue may have
a distorted effect when applied in the particular context of the
host economy. One outstanding example of this sort of problem
is revealed in the balance of payments/foreign exchange situation.
Most aid agencies in Pakistan have actively encouraged revision of
the official exchange rate in view of the inefficiencies which
have resulted from maintaining the present rate and the consequent
need for import licensing, However, it is clear that it has been
the ready availability of foreign exchange supplied by aid to
finance Pakistan's large international deficits (arising from
overvaluation of the official exchange rate) which has enabled
the government thus far to avoid devaluation. There is thus a
built-in inconsistency in the agencies which on the one hand press
their own governments for greater donations and. on the other,
chastise their hosts for making use of the opportunities these
sums create.
To take another example: confronted with the growing
problem of international debt servicing for under-developed
countries the Pearson aommission Report recommended more of the
same aid, albeit on cheaper terns, There was little exploration
of the extent to which external sources have substituted for
domestic finance and whether or not low cost foreign capital led
to optimal use of this scarce resource. A priori one would have
thought these appropriate subcts for discussion by international
advisers, And yet, if as we suspect, inefficiencies in the use
of foreign exchange and the substitution of foreign for domestic
resources have been the (nearly) inevitable outcome of the very
policies tendered by foreign advisers, it is not surprising that
our tecimocrats should avoid embarrassing themselves by critically
examining the effects of their own policies.
To take yet another example from the Pakistan case: a good
deal of western economic advice in Pakistan has concentrated on
switching the emphasis of economic policy from what is considered
to be the cusibersome inefficiency of direct controls toward the
package of indirect controls relying on the market mechanism and
market incentives: i.e. the standard tool kit of western policy
27.
makers. Attention is focussed on taxation, credit and so on,
as levers for exploiting the presumed efficiency of the market
mechanism as an allocative and decision-making device. There has
also been a great deal of emphasis on policies deliberately intended
to redistribute income in favour of profits in the modern sector
on the grounds that this will lead to increased savings and invest-
ment, hence faster growth of NP and ultimately higher income for
everyone0
Quite apart from the objections which can be made on nrinciule
to such an approach, it is rarely understood by the advisory groups
themselves that they must make very strong assumptions concerning
the (at least potential) competitiveness and profit-maximising
nature of the market, and the size and resilience of the market
structure in relation to public policy measures, for this approach
to be even internally consistent0 If these assumptions do not
hold the approach readily leads to self-contradiction. If the
economy is not very large and not very competitive, redistributing
income in favour of oligopolistic profita may simply enhance the
concentration of economic power, reduce the likelihood of new
entrants and generally reduce competitiveness even further. It
does not necessarily lead to higher rates of savings and investment.
Cheap government credit to industry will probably be pre-empted
by established oligcpoliats who may simply substitute these funda
for their own savings. Even freeing the exchange rate (as was
done for part of Pakistan's external transactions via the bonus
voucher system) does not necessarily have the intended effect.
The oligopolists, with their superior financial resources, can
simply bid up the price of foreign exchange sufficiently to close
out real or potential competitors and then pass this on through
the prices of their protected, monopolized output. Eventually
it is perfectly possible for a small group of oligopolists to
become so powerful that they are virtually unassailable both
economically and ultimately, politically, as well. When this
happens (and we would argue that it has almost happened in
Pakistan) there is great danger that the country will find itself
in the kind of cul-de-sac which has become so depressingly
f amiliar elsewhere in the world: inefficient industries producing
inappropriate goods behind high protective tariffs for monopoly
prices. The rich become more powerful and considerably richer
while the poor proliferate and military government follows military
government in an atmosphere of economic stagnation. The model
followed by the favoured few reverts to that of the high-living,
low-saving latifundista rather than the self-denying, high-saving
dynamic capitalist of Protestant ethic folklore, which provided
the original rationale for the policy package we have outlined.
In Pakistan, as in many other countries, it is difficult
then, to avoid the conclusion that the foreign establishment has
underwritten and contributed to a socioeconomic system and a
development strategy which has produced a monopolistic economic
structure which is neither efficient, dynamic nor equitable.
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Such an economy can achieve the objective of steady growth
only by continued dependence on reliable injections of foreign
resources to substitute for domestic savings and to subsidize
inefficient investment decisions. Whether advisory agencies have
promoted the policy packages outlined above in the honest belief
that the underlying model would be the best way to achieve a rapid
uaprovenent in the lot of the entire population, or whether out of
deliberate wish to create a "dependant class of puppets in prep-
aration for neo-colonialist exploitation", is largely irrelevant.
Foreign aid and advice, in Pakistan at least, has in fact encouraged
and enabled a small class of wealthy monopolists to extend their
control over the economy, the government, and the society, and has
also provided an intellectually representable argument to justify
this pattern to the rest of the world.
Seen in this context, we might take heed of the word of the
Cambridge University student warning his mates against careers as
foreign advisers that "foreign aid is using the money of the poor
people in the rich countries to pay the rich people in the poor
countries for their allegiance to the rich people in the rich
countries".
